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ABSTRACT
Context: The role of expert judgement is essential in our quest
to improve software project planning and execution. However, its
accuracy is dependent on many factors, not least the avoidance of
judgement biases, such as the anchoring bias, arising from being
influenced by initial information, even when it’s misleading or ir-
relevant. This strong effect is widely documented.
Objective: We aimed to replicate this anchoring bias using pro-
fessionals and, novel in a software engineering context, explore
de-biasing interventions through increasing knowledge and aware-
ness of judgement biases.
Method: We ran two series of experiments in company settings
with a total of 410 software developers. Some developers took part
in a workshop to heighten their awareness of a range of cognitive
biases, including anchoring. Later, the anchoring bias was induced
by presenting low or high productivity values, followed by the
participants’ estimates of their own project productivity. Our hy-
pothesis was that the workshop would lead to reduced bias, i.e.,
work as a de-biasing intervention.
Results: The anchors had a large effect (robust Cohen’s d = 1.19)
in influencing estimates. This was substantially reduced in those
participants who attended the workshop (robust Cohen’s d = 0.72).
The reduced bias related mainly to the high anchor. The de-biasing
intervention also led to a threefold reduction in estimate variance.
Conclusion: The impact of anchors upon judgement was substan-
tial. Learning about judgement biases does appear capable of mit-
igating, although not removing, the anchoring bias. The positive
effect of de-biasing through learning about biases suggests that it
has value.
KEYWORDS
Software engineering experimentation, Software effort estimation,
Expert judgement, Cognitive bias
1 INTRODUCTION
Effective management of software projects demands, amongst other
things, accurate resource predictions. For this reason cost or effort
modelling has been a major topic of research over many years
[17, 26]. However, the preponderance of this research has focused
on the development and evaluation of formal predictive models. In
contrast, the role of human experts — who engage in this process,
who make choices about model inputs and outputs — has been
somewhat neglected [13, 14].
Human judgement and decision-making has been studied for
decades by cognitive psychologists, e.g., the well known work of
Kahneman et al. [21, 33]. An important finding is that humans typ-
ically use heuristics, i.e., simple mental strategies which, although
sufficient in most circumstances, may lead to poor judgements and
decisions in others and software engineering is not exempt from
this.
When the use of heuristics leads to a deviation from a rational
norm, such as when the heuristic does not fit the context or is
based on misleading or irrelevant input, it leads to errors we call
judgement and decision biases. Heuristics, and consequently the
judgement and decision biases, are frequently unconscious. This
means that the users of heuristics typically will not be able to
explain properly how a judgement and or decision was made, why
a poor judgement or decision was made or know how to improve
the judgement and decision process.
Many judgement and decision biases have been identified, how-
ever our study focuses on the impact of the anchoring bias. This bias
is thoroughly documented as widespread and leading to significant
distortions of judgement [5, 22].
A judgement based on the anchoring heuristic, e.g., when esti-
mating effort or productivity, may frequently be useful. Imagine a
situation where a technically competent project leader indicates
that she believes that a software development task should take
about 10 work-hours. You are then asked about giving your judge-
ment about the effort you would need for that task. Given that the
project leader is competent, it saves you time and mental effort
to base your thinking process on that 10 work-hours as a good
starting point, or to compare the current task with other tasks with
size of about 10 work-hours to find out whether this is larger or
smaller. It may even improve the accuracy of the effort estimate.
But what if the number used by your anchoring heuristics is totally
irrelevant, such as the number of hours spent on your previous
task, or misleading, such as a very low number of work-hours a
technically incompetent client wants you to use? Several studies
suggest that software professionals, like everyone else, are affected
by presented numbers, even when they are irrelevant or mislead-
ing [10, 15]. This happens even when professionals are explicitly
requested to ignore them [18, 29].
While there are hundreds of studies on the presence of human
biases in judgement and decision making, including many on the
anchoring bias, there has not been much research on the impact of
increased awareness of cognitive biases on the reduction of such
biases (i.e., de-biasing). To investigate this topic, we conducted an
experiment where the intervention was a workshop to increase
participant awareness of cognitive biases and then compared these
results with those of participants from a previously published exper-
iment completing the same taskwho had not attended theworkshop
[16].
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Another limitation of previous research is that most evidence for
the existence of the anchoring bias comes from student samples and
the use of tasks where students have little previous experience. In
contrast, the sample in our study comprised professional software
developers who were asked to estimate their own productivity on
a task they had previously completed. This, we believe, makes the
task more familiar for the subject and increases the relevance of
the results to real-world tasks.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. First we
present related work and supporting evidence for cognitive biases
and how this might impact judgement and decision making. Next
we describe the two-factor experimental design (low and high an-
chor, de-biasing and no intervention) experiment. We present the
results of our robust statistical analysis, initially from 118 profes-
sional participants and then pooled with participants from a set of
previous experiments. We conclude by discussing the implications
of these results for improving professional judgements and outline
some areas for further investigation.
2 RELATEDWORK
The anchoring bias is one of the strongest, easiest to create, robust,
long-lasting and studied of the human biases [9]. The most famous
study of the anchoring bias involved a rigged wheel of fortune and
the question:What percentage of themembers of the UN areAfrican
countries? First, the research participants span the wheel, which
stopped at 10 or 65 depending on how the wheel was rigged, and
were asked whether they thought the percentage African countries
in the UN was more than or less than the number on the wheel.
Following that question, the participants were asked to predict the
proportion of African countries in the UN. The difference in answers
between the two groups was large. Those in the first group (wheel
stopping at 10) gave a median prediction of 25% African countries
in the UN, while those in the second group (wheel stopping at 65)
gave a median prediction of 45% [33]. It is hard to imagine that the
participants would think that a number on awheel of fortune, which
they believed gave a random number between 0 and 100, revealed
any information about the actual proportion of African countries
in the UN. Nevertheless, they were strongly affected by the number
presented to them. Numerous subsequent studies, following similar
anchoring inducing procedures, have shown similar effects. Even
completely irrelevant anchors, such as digits from social security
numbers or phone numbers, have been demonstrated to strongly
bias people’s judgements [2]
The anchoring bias is clearly relevant outside artificial experi-
mental settings. Software professionals’ time predictions were for
example strongly affected by knowledge about what a customer
had communicated as her expectation of time usage, in spite of
being informed that the customer had no competence in predicting
the time usage [18]. When asking these professionals whether they
thought they had been affected by the customer’s expectations, i.e.,
by the anchoring information, they either denied it or responded
that they were just affected a little. This feeling of not being much
affected, when in reality being affected a lot, is part of what makes
the anchoring bias potent and hard to avoid. Even extreme anchors
or suggestions, for instance that the length of a whale is 900 me-
tres (unreasonably high anchor) or 0.2 metres (unreasonably low
anchor), is effective in influencing people’s judgements [32]. An-
choring effects seem to be pretty robust to all kinds of warnings.
The following are instructions from a software development effort
estimation study on anchoring: I admit I have no experience with
software projects, but I guess this will take about two months to finish.
I may be wrong, of course; we’ll wait for your calculations for a better
estimate [1]. In spite of the warnings, the software developers were
strongly affected by the anchoring value of two months.
The cognitive basis of the anchoring bias is disputed and there
are at least three different, partly overlapping, explanations: 1) An-
choring as communication (the attitude change theory), i.e., that it
is natural for us to give weight to what other people communicate
[34]. 2) Anchors as a starting point (the anchoring and adjustment
theory), i.e., that the anchor is the starting point and that the adjust-
ment away from the anchor typically is insufficient [21]. 3) Anchors
as an activating experience (the selective accessibility theory), i.e.,
that the anchor activates experiences and that recently activated
experience is more likely to be used in the subsequent judgement
process [28]. All explanations have supporting evidence and it is
possible that they all contribute to the observed anchoring bias.
De-biasing is applying mitigating interventions to reduce the
impact of a bias. Fischhoff [8] suggests a fourfold classification
scheme:
• (a) warning about the possibility of bias without specifying
its nature.
• (b) describing the direction (and possibly extent) of the bias
that might typically be observed.
• (c) providing feedback, preferably at a personal level.
• (d) offering an extended program of training with feedback,
coaching, etc
Given the large effect size and importance of the anchor bias, it
is not surprising that research has been devoted to study de-biasing
strategies, including how to reduce or remove the anchoring bias.
Although several methods for de-biasing have been proposed and
tested, researchers have struggled to remove this effect. Examples
of de-biasing strategies with some positive effect, but far from elimi-
nating the bias, are to “consider the opposite" [30] and introduction
of new, more relevant, anchors (known as re-biasing) [23]. The
study by Lovallo and Sibony [24] reported that the 25% compa-
nies best at avoiding and reducing decision biases, i.e., better at
de-biasing, had a 5.3% advantage over the 25% worst (i.e., 6.9% vs
1.6% typical ROI). This suggests that de-biasing strategies are of
substantial real-world importance.
In our paper, we examine the de-biasing effect of increasing
the awareness of the anchoring effect among software developers.
The evidence in support of this type of de-biasing is mixed. A
positive, although not very large, effect of a training-based increase
of bias awareness, including the anchoring bias, was reported in
[27]. In contrast, no positive effect was found from teaching-based
increase of bias awareness by [31]. The study reported by Welsh
et al. [36] found a positive effect from increased bias awareness
on the overconfidence bias, but none for the anchoring bias. The
general finding seems to be that increased bias awareness typically
has moderate to no effect on how much people are biased in their
judgements and decisions [20]. No prior studies have, as far as we
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know, reported on the effect of increased anchoring bias awareness
in the context of professional software developers.
3 EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
3.1 Participants
This study is based upon two series of experiments. The first was
conducted by MJ and involved 292 participants from industry with
no workshop (de-biasing) intervention. The second series were
conducted by CM and MS with MJ involved for the first experiment
of the second series. These experiments replicated the initial exper-
imental design (this is documented in [16] as Estimation Task 1). In
addition, the de-biasing intervention of a workshop was introduced
prior to the actual experimental task. Table 1 shows the counts of
participants by treatment. The participants were all professional
software developers drawn from a total of 15 companies and seven
different countries as indicated by Table 2. They were recruited as
volunteers from companies with whom MJ had previously collabo-
rated. This was supplemented by attendees from effort estimation
workshops delivered by MS and CM in the UK and New Zealand.
Workshop? High Anchor Low Anchor Total
N 142 150 292
Y 60 58 118
Total 202 208 410
Table 1: Participants by Treatment
Country Count
Nepal 59
New Zealand 18
Poland 92
Romania 48
United Kingdom 16
Ukraine 114
Vietnam 63
Total 410
Table 2: Participants by Country
3.2 Experimental Design
The participants were randomly allocated to either the high anchor
or low anchor group. Each group was then given separate anchor
values. The low anchor was based on the question “Do you believe
your coding productivity was greater than 1 LOC per hour on
your last project?". By contrast, the high anchor was based on the
question “Do you believe your coding productivity was less than
200 LOC per hour on your last project?". Participants recorded the
response, ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. They were then all asked to report their
estimate of programming productivity in LOC per hour. The actual
estimates are used for this analysis.
The de-biasing intervention comprised a 2–3 hour workshop on
cognitive bias and estimation given immediately prior to the above
task. Participants were introduced to the concept of cognitive bias
and given examples from the psychology literature demonstrating
the influence of bias on decision making. The biases covered in-
cluded over-optimism and over-confidence [35], planning fallacy
[4], peak-end rule [19], dual-process theory [6], blind spot bias [11]
and anchoring [33]. The workshop concluded with a discussion
on the influence of bias on prediction and estimating. In terms of
Fischhoff’s [8] classification scheme of de-biasing interventions we
(b) described the direction and possible extent of the bias and (c)
provided some personal feedback via an example task.
3.3 Data Collection and Cleaning
We recorded the following information from each participant sum-
marised in Table 3.
Variable Explanation
P_id Unique participant id
Workshop Y or N depending on the use of a de-biasing
intervention
Block Specific id of the experiment, e.g., there are mul-
tiple deliveries for some companies either at
different times or locations.
Company The employing company of the software devel-
oper - anonymised
Country The country where the software development
company is located
Anchor High or low depending on the randomly allo-
cated treatment
EstProd Estimated coding productivity in LOC per hour
for the last completed software project. This is
the response variable.
Table 3: Data Collected
In terms of data cleaning we discarded participants who esti-
mated their productivity as:
• missing values (5 cases eliminated)
• zero values as this implied that the participant had not en-
gaged in coding (3 cases eliminated)
• excessively high values of ⩾ 500 LOC per hour since this
implies an implausible level of productivity of almost one
LOC per 7 seconds! (4 cases eliminated)
A representative sample of five rows of the data are given in Table
4. The raw data andR scripts are available fromhttps://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.5414200.v3
.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Summary statistics
In this section we present the results of our analysis of the exper-
imental data. First we give the basic descriptive statistics for the
response variable Estimated Productivity, then explore the basic
anchoring effect and finally our main intervention: the de-biasing
effect of the workshop.
Table 5 describes our response variable Estimated Productivity.
We see values that range from 0.5 to 300 (after the data cleaning
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P_id Workshop Block Company Country Anchor Est_Prod
P130 N G G Ukraine high 100.0
P334 Y I3 I Poland high 20.0
P318 Y I3 I Poland low 1.5
P250 N K K Vietnam low 15.0
P10 N A A Romania high 80.0
Table 4: Example Data Collected
Count Mean Median SD Min Max Trim Trim
mean SD
410 52.7 30 58.7 0.5 300 37.5 51.0
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Estimated Productivity
described in Section 3.3) with a strong positive skew (evidenced by
the mean being greater than the median and the strong deviations
particularly of the upper tail in the qqplot (Fig. 1). For this reason
we also compute a 20% trimmed mean and standard deviation as
more robust estimators [37]. Both are less than their untrimmed
counterparts due to the positive skew (Table 5).
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Figure 1: Estimated productivity qqplot
The qqplot also reveals the presence of many ties (horizontal
segments of the curve) which correspond to popular round numbers.
For example there are no predictions of 9LOC, but 41 of 10LOC
and two of 11LOC. This is illustrated clearly by the stem and leaf
plot where we see zero dominates as a trailing digit, followed by
a five (see Fig. 2). Perhaps even more remarkable is that not one
participant made an estimate ending in a nine. We conjecture that
there is a high degree of uncertainty in the estimates which leads
participants to use 5, 10, 20, ... rather than 9 (which would suggest
a strong belief in estimation accuracy). For a discussion of the
rounding phenomenon see [12].
4.2 The Anchor Effect
Recall that we do not know the true productivity levels for each
participant. But given the random allocation of participants to the
Figure 2: Estimated productivity as a stem and leaf plot
anchor treatments we do not believe there is any good reason to
expect one group to be more productive than the other. The first
thing to observe is the impact of the anchor on all participants,
shown graphically in Fig. 3 as boxplots. Note the presence of ex-
treme outliers, denoted by individual observations, for both anchor
treatments. Note also the substantial difference in medians, shown
by the line across each box and the 95% confidence limits for the
medians shown by the notches which do not overlap.
More formally we can compare the two samples using the robust
Yuen test with bootstrap to estimate the 95% confidence interval.
The impact of the anchor is statistically significant, p ≈ 0. The
trimmed mean difference is 60.5 and the 95% confidence interval is
(51.6, 69.4). In terms of effect size, this is either simply the trimmed
mean difference of ∼ 60 LOC per hour between a low and high
anchor estimate. Alternatively, if we want to standardise the effect
size we can compute a robust version of Cohen’s d using a pooled
trimmed standard deviation which yields ∼ 1.18, an effect size
which is between large and very large (0.8–1.3) [7]. Essentially when
software professionals are asked to estimate coding productivity,
the percentage difference between the low and high anchor groups
was approximately 350%.
4.3 The Workshop Effect
So having shown that the anchor effect is very strong in the con-
text of software estimation, we next consider the impact of the
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Figure 3: Boxplots of Estimated Productivity by Anchor
Value
de-biasing intervention of the workshop. But first, we need to ad-
dress a potential confounder in that the study design is unbalanced;
we can see that there are experimental blocks that didn’t receive
the intervention at all, or vice versa (see Table 6). This is potentially
problematic as the productivity estimates also differ considerably
by country (see Table 7). The UK shows much lower Estimated
Productivity and Nepal and Vietnam much higher than the other
countries. Therefore we exclude the UK, Nepal and Vietnam to mit-
igate this problem. This leaves 272 participants with 102 receiving
the de-biasing intervention.
Country N Y
Nepal 59 0
NZ 0 18
Poland 47 45
Romania 48 0
UK 0 16
Ukraine 75 39
Vietnam 63 0
Table 6: Frequency Count of De-biasing Treatment by Coun-
try
We compare the estimates visually in Fig. 4 that groups partic-
ipants both by anchor (low or high) and by de-biasing treatment
(Y or N). It is clear from the boxplots that the median Estimated
Productivity for the high anchor without de-biasing (high.N) is sub-
stantially greater than the median with de-biasing (high.N). Recall
that the notches indicate the 95% confidence limits and note that
these do not overlap. As indicated by the size of the whiskers, the
spread of estimates also seems greater when there is no de-biasing
Country Mean EstProd
Nepal 75.39
NZ 33.4
Poland 41.0
Romania 51.4
UK 14.6
Ukraine 47.0
Vietnam 75.3
Table 7: Mean Estimated Productivity by Country
Figure 4: Boxplots of Estimated Productivity by De-biasing
Intervention
Legend: high.N = high anchor, no de-biasing; low.N = low anchor, no de-biasing; high.Y =
high anchor, de-biasing; low.Y = low anchor, de-biasing
workshop. Likewise, we see extreme outliers particularly for the
no workshop condition. However, the effect for the low anchor is
less obvious.
The median estimate of hourly productivity for the high anchor
is reduced from 100 to 30 LOC/hr but for the low anchor the median
remains unchanged at 10 LOC/hr. There are three possible reasons
for the similarity of themedian estimates for those in the low anchor
group. First, the companies, and their software professionals, in
the workshop group may have been more productive and as a
consequence produced even lower estimates in a no workshop
context. Second, it is harder to influence people to be negative
about one’s own performance, i.e., that there is less room for de-
biasing interventions for the low anchor. Third, the de-biasing
intervention may have increased their awareness of the optimism-
inducing effect of anchor values, which in this case is the increase
in productivity values through a high anchor, but not so much
the optimism-reducing effect, corresponding to a low productivity
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anchor. More studies are needed to analyse and better understand
this potentially interesting finding.
Anchor No workshop Workshop
high 92.85 37.73
(53.72) (27.34)
low 19.17 13.20
(25.89) (12.67)
Table 8: Mean and Standard Deviations for Estimated Pro-
ductivity by Anchor and De-biasing Workshop
We also tabulate comparisons of means and, in parentheses,
standard deviations in Table 8 and robust analogues based on 20%
trimming in Table 9. Since trimming tends to remove extreme values
we see the general effect is to slightly reduce our estimates of centre
and dispersion.
Anchor No workshop Workshop
high 86.44 31.42
(58.51) (22.20)
low 13.08 10.18
(14.05) (10.26)
Table 9: 20% TrimmedMean and Standard Deviations for Es-
timated Productivity by Anchor and De-biasing Workshop
Formally we can compare the central tendency and dispersion
of the two conditions. For central tendency we apply the robust
Yuen’s test and find the trimmed mean difference is 25.6, p ≈ 0 and
the 95% confidence interval is (15.5, 35.7). This strongly suggests
that the de-biasing workshop reduces estimates of productivity.
Inasmuch as the higher estimates are influenced upwards by the
anchor this is a desirable outcome.
However, we might also expect the spread of estimates to be
narrowed if the effect of the anchors are reduced. To compare spread
or dispersion we use a simple robust test to compare variance.
We expect the de-biasing to reduce the variance of the estimates
since the anchors will have less impact and not stretch out the
distribution of estimates. Robust 20% trimmed estimates of standard
deviation are given in Table 10 which indicates that the standard
deviation is reduced about threefold with the de-biasing workshop
intervention. As a formality we test that this reduction is significant.
Since we already know the distribution is heavy-tailed, skewed and
generally non-Gaussian, we use the Brown-Forsythemedian variant
of Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance [3]. This gives a Test
Statistic of 36.3, p ≈ 0 meaning it is highly likely the two groups
have different variances.
No workshop Workshop
54.63 17.04
Table 10: 20% Trimmed Standard Deviations for Estimated
Productivity by De-biasing Workshop
Considering both factors, the Anchor and the de-biasing Work-
shop togetherwe useANOVA, specifically the robust 2-way between-
between method of Wilcox [25, 37]. The results are given in Table
11 however, we need to sound a note of caution. The variance is
strongly heteroscedastic, the data imbalanced and therefore there
may be ordering effects, so we only consider gross outcomes. There
is strong evidence that both Anchor and Workshop are associated
with estimated productivity, Anchor more so. It is also clear there
is an interaction between Anchor and De-biasing confirmed by the
Interaction Plot (Fig. 5). Essentially the de-biasing intervention only
seems to impact the high anchor condition. This might be because
(i) negative values for the estimate are meaningless and (ii) as we
suspect the many of the higher values e.g., greater than 100 LOC/hr
are somewhat hard to accept. Therefore it is probable that the high
anchor is causing more bias or distortion than the low anchor.
Factor F p
Anchor 192.5 < 0.001
Workshop 72.2 < 0.001
Anchor:Workshop 58.4 < 0.001
Table 11: Robust 2-way Analysis of Variance
Figure 5: Interaction Plot of Anchor and De-biasing Inter-
vention
To summarise, we have strong evidence of both the anchor effect
and a mitigating effect from the de-biasing workshop. In terms of
effect size, this is either simply the trimmed mean difference of 26
LOC per hour between an estimate with and without de-biasing.
(This is substantial but less than the Anchor effect). If we want
to standardise we can compute a robust version of Cohen’s d us-
ing a pooled trimmed standard deviation giving d ∼ 0.72 which
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suggests a medium to large effect (0.5 – 0.8) [7]. Alternatively the
impact of de-biasing can be assessed by considering the reduction
in the spread of estimates (since the anchors will have a reduc-
ing distorting effect as a consequence of the de-biasing). We find
that the standard deviation of the de-biased estimates is reduced
about threefold so again support for the impact of our de-biasing
workshops.
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study we have addressed the real world problem of how
biases, specifically the anchoring bias, influence software profes-
sionals making estimates and then how they might be mitigated.
To do this we have conducted a series of experiments across seven
countries with 410 participants. We believe this study is important
because despite the emphasis on formal prediction systems, project
cost decisions are ultimately made by humans, and these judge-
ments are infrequent, but of high value. Therefore they cannot be
conceived of as purely technical problems.
Our experiments yield four main findings.
(1) The effect of anchors on software professionals performing
estimation tasks, in line with previous studies, such as [23],
is very strong.
(2) The de-biasing workshop significantly reduces — but does
not eliminate — this bias.
(3) The workshop also substantially reduces the variability in
the estimates of professionals approximately threefold
(4) The workshop has a greater impact for the high rather than
low anchor (although given the meaninglessness of a nega-
tive estimate, low estimates could only change in one direc-
tion).
However, there are some limitations to this work. First, we have
only considered one type of bias and a relatively simple de-biasing
intervention based on a 2-3 hour workshop. There are many other
cognitive biases and judgement fallacies, at least some of which
could be relevant to software engineering. Another limitation is
that we don’t know how long the de-biasing effect will last, but it is
quite possible it is only transient. Therefore follow up work might
be useful.
Nevertheless, this study has practical significance. It shows how
professionals can be easily misled into making highly distorted
judgements. This matters in that despite all our tools and automa-
tion, software engineering remains a profession that requires judge-
ment and flair. Fortunately, we show, that it is possible to reduce,
although not eliminate, these deleterious effects. There may well
also be considerable scope for refining and improving de-biasing
interventions.
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